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1DECIM:
Detecting Endpoint Compromise In Messaging
Jiangshan Yu, Mark Ryan, and Cas Cremers
Abstract—We present DECIM, an approach to solve the chal-
lenge of detecting endpoint compromise in messaging. DECIM
manages and refreshes encryption/decryption keys in an auto-
matic and transparent way: it makes it necessary for uses of the
key to be inserted in an append-only log, which the device owner
can interrogate in order to detect misuse.
We propose a multi-device messaging protocol that exploits our
concept to allow users to detect unauthorised usage of their device
keys. It is co-designed with a formal model, and we verify its core
security property using the Tamarin prover. We present a proof-
of-concept implementation providing the main features required
for deployment. We find that DECIM messaging is efficient even
for millions of users.
The methods we introduce are not intended to replace existing
methods used to keep keys safe (such as hardware devices, careful
procedures, or key refreshment techniques). Rather, our methods
provide a useful and effective additional layer of security.
Index Terms—Key usage detection, transparency, secure mes-
saging, key management, formal analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spurred by government surveillance [1]–[3] and users’
desire for strong security [4], a new trend of using end-
to-end secure communication has spread. Large companies
and security communities have started to deploy and provide
message services with end-to-end encryption, which include
Apple iMessage, Facebook WhatsApp, Google End-to-End
email encryption, and Telegram Messenger, to millions of
users.
One challenge in providing end-to-end encrypted messag-
ing concerns how to authenticate public keys. Even though
methods based on the CA-model (e.g. S/MIME) and the web-
of-trust (e.g. OpenPGP) have been available for decades, they
have failed to be widely deployed because of the security and
usability concerns [5]. Recently, CIRT [6] and CONIKS [7]
have been proposed to solve the key authentication problem for
messaging, by making all issued key bindings transparent to
end-users. Both CIRT and CONIKS support multiple devices,
and detect misbehaviours or compromise of the key certifica-
tion authority. However, while these services provide a good
level of protection on users’ communication, they still rely on
the assumption that the end-device cannot be compromised.
Yet, this assumption is rather hard to justify in practice: new
software vulnerabilities [8]–[10] are discovered every day, and
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malware is common on mobile devices such as phones and
tablets [11] as well as on traditional platforms like desktop
PCs.
Signal [12] (formerly TextSecure) moves a step towards han-
dling device compromise. It rotates keys through a ratcheting
process (a.k.a. Axolotl protocol), which generates three types
of keys, namely root key, chain key, and message key. The
root key is a relatively long-term key generated from users’
public keys and updated through the ratchet process. The chain
key and message key are ephemeral keys derived from the
associated root key. Each chain key is a session key, and the
associated message keys are used to encrypt/decrypt messages
exchanged in that session. (We refer the reader to [13] for more
detail.)
An attacker who learns the chain keys and message keys
will not be able to learn messages that have been exchanged
in other sessions. However, if the root key has also been
compromised, then the attacker is able to perform a man-
in-the-middle (MITM) attack to intercept future messages.
Additionally, the ratcheting process can lock the attacker out
from the point that the attacker discontinued being the MITM.
The ratcheting process has been built into several systems
including WhatsApp, one of the most popular messaging
platforms.
Whilst Signal is an important contribution to message
security, it leaves open the question of how to defend against
an attacker (e.g., a platform operator or an internet service
provider) who is in a unique position to act as a persistent
MITM, and has previously compromised a victim’s device.
This paper explores a different part of the complex design
space inhabited by CIRT/CONIKS and Signal. We develop
DECIM, a method to Detect Endpoint Compromise in Mes-
saging applications.
Contribution Our first contribution is to develop an attacker
model in which platforms may be periodically compromised.
That means that they can be compromised by an attacker at any
time, but we assume that the victim periodically takes steps to
remove malware and eliminate vulnerabilities. Unfortunately,
the compromise could have revealed long-term keys. We thus
propose security goals that aim to detect the subsequent usage
of such keys by the attacker.
Second, we propose an approach for detecting endpoint
compromise in messaging (DECIM), to transparently manage
ephemeral encryption/decryption keys. It enables users to
detect subsequent usage of compromised long-term keys by
the attacker even against a persistent MITM attacker, while
avoiding the use of expensive and inconvenient manual pro-
2cess for re-authenticating and distributing keys through the
underlying PKIs (e.g. applying for a new certificate from a
CA), unless attacks are actually detected.
We develop two DECIM protocols. The first is a basic
protocol that makes strong assumptions about the participants
being simultaneously online, and serves mostly to explain
the concepts. The second protocol is a more fully developed
messaging application, supporting multiple devices per user
and allowing the receiver to be offline at the time the sender
sends a message.
We provide a proof-of-concept implementation of the de-
tailed messaging application, and conduct a performance eval-
uation on the system. It shows that the protocol is efficient and
scalable: even in an extreme case, i.e. the messaging system
has been operating for 100 years with 109 users (each with 3
devices), clients only need to download 2.2 KB extra data for
the compromise detection. The memory usage on the server
side for enrolling 105 new devices of distinct users is only
410 MB, and it takes roughly 5.7 milliseconds on average for
each request.
Our third contribution is the security analysis which shows
that the protocols satisfy precise properties expressing software
damage containment. Informally, if an attacker controlled de-
vice has been recovered from a compromised state to a secure
state, then our system can automatically detect a (persistent)
MITM attacker. Therefore the victim will be prompted to
manually revoke the key and generate a new one. We use
the TAMARIN prover to prove several core properties of our
protocol.
We proceed in the following way. In Section II, we present
the background and related work. We detail our attacker model
in Section III and present the main idea of our DECIM
protocols in Section IV. The implementation of our messaging
protocol is presented in Section V in full detail. We analyse the
security of our proposal in Section VI, present the performance
evaluations in Section VII, and conclude in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Axolotl protocol As mentioned previously, the Axolotl
protocol implemented in Signal [12] uses a ratchet process
to handle device compromise against a non-persistent MITM
attacker. Similar security guarantees are also provided by other
messaging protocols; see [14] for a detailed survey.
FlipIt FLIPIT is an abstract game-theoretic framework for
modelling security scenarios similar to the attacker model of
our paper. In the FLIPIT game [15], the attacker player moves
by compromising a system, and the defender player moves by
recovering it into a secure state. The FLIPIT paper explores
strategies for defender and attacker, based on an abstract notion
of costs associated with moves.
Drifting keys Drifting keys [16] is an approach for detecting
device impersonation when an attacker has obtained a copy
of pre-shared secret keys stored in constrained devices (such
as sensors). Roughly speaking, each key is updated by the
sender by appending a random bit. If two inconsistent keys
of the same device are detected by the receiver, then it learns
that the pre-shared keys at the sender side (i.e. the constrained
devices) has been compromised and used by an attacker to
impersonate the device.
Funkspiel schemes Funkspiel schemes [17] is another ap-
proach to provide some security guarantee when a small device
(e.g. a smart-card) is compromised. Assuming the ability of the
small device to detect a break-in and overwrite stored secrets
before being controlled by an attacker, it aims to inform a
recipient that this has happened, without being noticed by the
attacker.
Certificate transparency Certificate transparency (CT) [18]
is a technique proposed by Google aiming to detect mis-issued
public key certificates. CT achieves this by recording all issued
certificates in an append-only Merkle tree log. CT has been
extended to handle revocation [6], and much work on building
transparent systems has been proposed based on the concept
of CT. Examples include ARPKI [19] and PoliCert [20]
for transparent PKI, and CIRT [6] and CONIKS [7] for
transparency in messaging systems.
III. THREAT MODEL AND DESIGN GOALS
Assumptions We assume a role called sender, that sends mes-
sages, and another one called receiver, that receives messages.
Users can perform one or both of those roles. Each user has
one or more devices, and can pick any of his/her devices to
send a message, and can receive messages on any of them.
We use Sally and Robert to refer to an arbitrary sender and
receiver, respectively.
Threat model The attacker has control over the network and
the messaging server. This means he can eavesdrop, modify,
insert and suppress any messages, and as many of them
he wants. In this way, he can act as a persistent MITM.
However, we also assume that the parties can occasionally
communicate short messages, possibly through an independent,
low-bandwidth and unreliable channel. The attacker has only
partial control of this additional channel — he can intercept,
modify and suppress messages, but not all of them all of
the time (occasionally, a message will get through)1. In other
words, we assume that the attacker can block all communica-
tions in one channel, but cannot block all communications in
all possible diverse channels.
In addition, the attacker may compromise any user’s devices
at any time. After compromising a device, the attacker fully
controls it, and can retrieve and store all the data (including
secret keys) that are stored on it.
Periodically and routinely, users detect and remove malware
on their devices, upgrade the operating system, and install
software patches that remove known vulnerabilities. This can
put the device back into a trustworthy state. The users do
1The idea of this secondary channel is to enable the users to detect a
misbehaving log server that shows different versions of the log to different
users. It has been used in other transparent log based systems, such as in CT,
CIRT and CONIKS. We indicate how this works at the end of the section
IV-C on page 6.
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Fig. 1. A device is compromised at time t1, and then restored into a secure
state at time t′1. This cycle is repeated. Thus, the device is in a compromised
state during the intervals {(tj , t
′
j) | j ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}}.
not regenerate long-term keys or change passwords unless
evidence of a compromised device has been found.
Thus, we assume that devices are periodically trustworthy.
An attacker compromises the device by exploiting a vulnera-
bility, and sometime later the device owner restores it into a
secure state. This cycle repeats, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The problem Once a device is compromised, then the victim’s
secrets stored in the device are exposed to the attacker. Per-
forming security updates and removing malware is insufficient
to prevent the attacker masquerading as the victim.
Security goals To solve this problem, our system detects key
usages by the attacker. We state our security goal here, and
explain how to achieve the goal in the following sections. In
the security statements below, we assume a parameter ζ, which
is a time period set by the user. A shorter ζ brings greater
security. However, devices are automatically unregistered from
the system if they are not used for periods longer than ζ, and
have to be re-registered. Thus, a very short ζ reduces usability.
Typically, ζ would be about two days. We discuss ζ and other
system parameters later.
In the next section, we develop two protocols: the basic
DECIM protocol and the full DECIM messaging application.
These offer slightly different guarantees.
• Basic DECIM protocol.
Suppose receiver Robert’s device is compromised during
the periods {(tj , t
′
j) | j ∈ N}. Suppose a message is sent
by sender Sally at time t from a device in a trustworthy
state, and the plaintext is obtained by the attacker. Robert
can detect this attack provided his device
– was well within a trustworthy state when the message
was sent; that is, t′j + ζ ≤ t ≤ tj+1 − ζ for some j.
• Messaging application (many users each with many
devices).
Suppose Robert’s devices are periodically compromised,
as before: Di is compromised during the intervals
{(ti,j , t
′
i,j) | j ∈ N}. Suppose a message is sent by Sally
at time t from a device in a trustworthy state, and the
plaintext is obtained by the attacker. Robert can detect
this attack provided, for each of his devices Di,
– Di was well within a trustworthy state when the
message was sent; that is, t′i,j + ζ ≤ t ≤ ti,j+1 − ζ for
some j, or
– Di was in a compromised state, but had not been used
by Robert since t− ζ.
The last condition reflects the fact that one can tell that a
device has been compromised if the device was not being
used at the time its key was used. Later, in Section IV-B,
we show the user interface that allows a user to check
this.
As part of our solution, we introduce an auxiliary role called
the log maintainer. In practice, there can be one or more
agents acting as log maintainers. We do not require that any of
these log maintainers are trusted and assume that the attacker
controls them.
IV. OVERVIEW OF DECIM
We present an overview of two protocols for detecting
endpoint compromise. In the first, the participants are a single
sender and a single receiver, assisted by a log maintainer. This
situation is too simple to be useful, but serves to illustrate the
core concepts. The second protocol is more involved; there
are multiple senders and receivers, and each of them has
multiple devices. This reflects a more realistic situation, and
the multiple devices assist in the detection of attacks.
A. The basic DECIM protocol
Our solution involves three roles: senders, receivers, and a
log maintainer. We assume all of these can be compromised.
We assume a log maintainer is capable of receiving data and
storing it in an append-only log.
During the bootstrapping phase, the receiver Robert obtains
or generates a long-term signing and verification key pair
(skR, vkR), and the sender Sally obtains an authentic copy of
vkR. The log maintainer has a signing key skL, and Robert and
Sally have an authentic copy of the corresponding verification
key vkL. How these keys are securely distributed is not the
subject of this paper; we assume it can be done through
PKIs such as S/MIME [21], PGP [22]–[24], CIRT [6], or
CONIKS [7].
The log maintainer signs and publishes digests of the log.
We use ‘digest’ to denote a short data item that uniquely
summarises the log (in practice, it is the root tree hash of
a Merkle tree). The maintainer is able to create cryptographic
proofs that given data is present or absent from the log. Data
is never deleted from the log represented by a given digest.
The log maintainer can also create proofs that a given digest
represents an append-only extension of the log represented by
a previous digest.
Sally and Robert track the digests issued by the log, all the
time checking the proofs issued by the log that later digests
represent extensions of earlier ones. Sally and Robert also
periodically directly exchange the digests they know about,
and request and check proofs of extension of those digests
with respect to those they already have. Our assumption that
the attacker cannot suppress all messages ensures that they are
being presented with the same version of the log.
The transmission part of the basic DECIM protocol then
runs as follows (see Figure 2).
• To prepare for receiving a message, Robert’s device
creates an ephemeral encryption and decryption key pair
(ek, dk), and certifies it with his long-term signing key
skR. He publishes the certificate CertskR(R, ek) in the
log. Publishing the certificate in the log assures Sally that
it is a valid encryption key belonging to Robert.
• To send a message, Sally’s device retrieves
CertskR(R, ek) from the log along with a proof of
4Sally Robert
- generate ephemeral (ek, dk)
- create a certificate σ = CertskR(R, ek)
- sends σ to the log maintainer
for insertion in log
σ
- request from the log maintainer
proofs that σ is present in log
- verify obtained proofs
- encrypt message m using ek
Encek(m)
- use dk to decrypt message
- request proofs from the log maintainer
to check that all keys in log for “Robert”
are genuine
Fig. 2. The basic DECIM protocol. Robert has a pair (skR, vkR) of long term
keys for signature signing and verification. He generates an ephemeral key
pair (ek, dk) for encryption, creates the certificate σ = CertskR (R, ek) on
ek, and sends the certificate to the log maintainer for insertion into the public
log. Meanwhile, Robert also sends the certificate to Sally. After receiving σ,
Sally requests from the log maintainer proofs that the certificate is present in
the log. If the proof is valid, Sally sends a message m to Robert encrypted
with ek. Robert requests proofs from the log maintainer to enable him to
verify whether the log contains signatures that he did not generate.
its currency in the log. She encrypts the message with
ek and sends it to Robert. Sally will not use a key whose
certificate is not in the log.
• Robert’s device receives the encrypted message and de-
crypts it.
Additionally, Robert’s device periodically checks (where the
period is determined by the parameter ζ) that all the keys
ek′ for which a certificate CertskR(R, ek
′) exists in the log
were put there by him. If he finds entries in the log not
corresponding to his actions, then he knows that his long term
credentials have been disclosed and abused by an attacker.
The basic protocol assumes that Robert is online at the
time that Sally wants to send a message. In the messaging
application protocol below, we generalise this to work when
Robert is offline.
Intuitively, our protocol design detects compromise attacks
because an attacker in possession of Robert’s long term key
would have to leave evidence of its usage of the key in the log.
We give examples of how this detection works in Section IV-C.
We perform a formal analysis of our designs in Section VI.
Properties of the log The security of the method requires
that an attacker cannot remove information from the log. To
achieve this, the log is typically stipulated to be append-only.
It is also a requirement that users of the log (including Robert)
can verify that no information has been deleted from the log.
For this purpose, the log can be organised as a Merkle tree
[25] in which data is inserted by extending the tree to the
right. Such a log was designed and introduced in certificate
transparency [18]. The log maintainer can provide efficient
proofs that (A) some particular data is present in the log, and
(B) the log is being maintained in an append-only manner.
Proof A is referred to as proof of presence (PoP) and proof B
is referred to as proof of extension (PoE).
Certificate transparency has been extended to provide proofs
that all data associated to some attribute (e.g. keys associated
to a user identity) is absent from the log, and proofs that some
data associated to some attribute is the latest valid data in the
log. The former is referred to as proof of absence, and the
latter as proof of currency [6], [7].
B. DECIM Messaging application
The DECIM messaging application generalises the basic
DECIM protocol, allowing the users to have multiple devices.
Sally can choose any of her devices to send a message, and
Robert is able to receive the message on all of his devices.
Although this makes the protocol a bit more complicated, it
also allows us to obtain a stronger security guarantee, because
even if one of Robert’s devices is in an untrustworthy state
we are able to leverage security from the other ones.
As before, we assume a log, with the same capabilities
mentioned above. We also assume that Robert and the log
maintainer have long-term signing and verification key pairs
(skR, vkR) (skL, vkL) respectively, and all parties have au-
thentic copies of the verification keys they need.
The parameters δ, ǫ and ζ The protocol is parameterised
by three values:
• δ is the period between the times at which device registra-
tion requests are processed. It is set by the log maintainer.
We expect it to be typically one hour.
• ǫ is the period between the times at which key update
requests are processed. We refer to such periods as
“epochs”. It is also set by the log maintainer, and is
typically one day.
• ζ is the maximum lifetime of a key. It is set by the user.
Different users can choose different values of ζ, subject
to the constraint ǫ ≤ ζ. We expect it to be about two or
three days.
The messaging protocol has three main sub-protocols: en-
rolling, message transmission, and key updates. We describe
these in turn.
Enrolling a device To enroll a device Dℓ, Robert needs to
install skR onto it. We assume that skR is derived from a
passphrase that Robert types into Dℓ. Next, Dℓ needs to create
a key pair and publish its certificate in the log. More precisely:
• Dℓ generates a new ephemeral encryption key pair
(ekℓ, dkℓ) and sends the certificate CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ)
to the log maintainer. Here, tℓ is the key creation time.
The key will be used from the current time until the next
epoch beginning, for the purpose of encrypting messages
for Robert’s device.
• After time δ, the log maintainer has inserted the certificate
into the log and sends to Dℓ the list of device certifi-
cates CertskR(Di, eki, ti) for Robert present in the log,
together with a proof that the list is complete, and current
in the log.
• Dℓ verifies the proof of currency for CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ).
It displays the table (Di, ti) (for each i) to Robert, so he
can check that the devices mentioned are indeed recently
used. If Robert sees a device mentioned that he has not
recently used, it is evidence of an attack (§ IV-D). Figure
5Fig. 3. An example of envisaged GUI that presents the table (Di, ti) for
i = {1, 2} to Robert. The ticked box against the “key usage proof” indicates
that the proofs about the usage statement (e.g., last update time) have been
cryptographically verified.
3 presents an example of the envisaged GUI to show how
the information is likely to be presented to Robert.
The device is now ready to be used. When Sally encrypts
a message, her device will obtain all the public parts of the
current ephemeral keys for Robert from the log, and encrypt
the messages with each of them.
Remark. The method of displaying on a user’s device the
user’s activities on other devices is well-known (for example,
in Gmail, a user can click “last account activity” to see a table
of the sessions open by other devices). A crucial difference in
our protocol is that the displaying device can fully verify the
veracity of the account activity provided by the untrusted log
maintainer.
Sending and receiving a message
• To send a message, Sally retrieves CertskR(Di, eki, ti)
(for each available i) from the log along with proofs of
currency. Her device encrypts a copy of the message by
using each received eki according to the specific end-
to-end secure messaging protocol that they both use2.
It sends the encrypted message and together with the
encrypted k to each of Robert’s devices.
• Robert picks up any of his devices, receives the encrypted
message, and decrypts it.
Updating the keys Whenever Robert invokes the messaging
app on a device Dℓ, the device checks to see if it is the first
time it has run the app during that ǫ-long epoch. If so, it
generates a new device key which will become the key for the
following epoch. More precisely, on the first invocation during
an epoch:
• Dℓ requests and verifies proof of currency for all of the
current epoch’s device certificates CertskR(Di, eki, ti) for
each available i. It verifies that ekℓ is indeed the one it
created and sent the previous epoch; if this verification
fails, it is evidence of an attack (§ IV-D). Dℓ displays
the table (Di, ti) (each i) to Robert, so he can check that
the devices mentioned are indeed recently used. If Robert
2The design of DECIM is agnostic about the specific end-to-end secure
messaging protocol used; e.g. it could be PGP, Axolotl, or something else.
For simplicity and concreteness, in the detailed presentation of DECIM in
section V, and also in the Tamarin proofs of section VI, we encrypt messages
by using the hybrid mechanism deployed in PGP and iMessage.
sees a device mentioned that he has not recently used, it
is again evidence of an attack.
• Dℓ next creates a new ephemeral encryption key pair
(ek′ℓ, dk
′
ℓ) and sends the certificate CertskR(Dℓ, ek
′
ℓ, tℓ)
to the log maintainer. Here, tℓ is the key creation time.
• By the next epoch, the log maintainer has inserted into the
log all the device keys thus received. If a device does not
send a new key during an epoch, the old key is retained
in subsequent epochs until a period ζ has elapsed. At
that time, keys of devices that did not send new keys are
revoked.
• When a new key becomes valid, Dℓ securely removes the
old key in the device.
In other words, devices change their key every epoch, and if
they don’t do so (because the application is not invoked during
a particular epoch) then their key is reused for a certain period,
and then revoked. In this last case, the device can’t be used
until it re-registers.
C. Detecting attacks: examples
To provide intuition on how our protocol allows users to
detect attacks, we explain some potential attack detection
scenarios. We will present our formal security analysis in
Section VI.
Attacks from a third party
Suppose one of Robert’s devices, say his phone, is infected
with malware, allowing an adversary to misuse all the keys
stored on the device. Suppose the adversary is the messaging
service provider acting as a persistent MITM. The adversary
may decrypt messages encrypted with ephemeral keys in that
epoch, and may create new signed ephemeral keys by using
the phone’s long term key and inserting them into the log to
perform MITM attacks in future epochs.
Robert routinely performs malware scanning and software
patching, which may or may not help him regain the control
of his phone depending on the robustness of the malware. It
is obvious that one can do nothing for the epoch in which
the adversary has all the ephemeral secrets for decryption. We
focus on the more interesting case, namely, the security of
messages exchanged in future epochs.
If Robert regains control of his phone, and the attacker
continues to use the phone’s long-term key to create ephemeral
keys, the phone can detect this activity via the log, and report
it to the user.
If the adversary remains in full control of the phone, then
Robert might still be able to detect the device compromise by
monitoring the long-term key usage – he notices unexpected
usage of phone using the GUI of Figure 3. The figure shows
the GUI displayed on another device of Robert’s. It informs
him that (so far in the current epoch) the keys corresponding
to his phone and his iPad have been active. If Robert has not
used his phone in the epoch, then he learns that it has been
compromised. The GUI also confirms that the proofs about
the usage statement have been cryptographically verified.
Attacks on or by the log maintainer Suppose the log main-
tainer is malicious or compromised. It may provide fake proofs,
or provide no proofs at all. This is readily detected by client
6software. It may maintain the log incorrectly, either by not
correctly recording signed ephemeral keys or by incorrectly
recording fake ephemeral keys. These attacks are detected
when the key owner requests a complete proof of presence.
A more interesting attack arises if the log maintainer shows
different versions of the log to different users. A receiver
may see a version in which his ephemeral keys are correctly
recorded, while the sender sees a version in which attacker-
owned keys are present instead. This would allow the attacker
to play man-in-the-middle attacks, preventing the sender and
receiver ever exchanging information about the log digests they
have. In DECIM, users can detect such attacks by gossiping
with their contacts, for example, through an out-of-band chan-
nel as used in Signal [12], or through a gossip protocol [26]–
[28] as recommended by Google CT [18] and CONIKS [7].
Such a procedure will ensure that the log maintainer is not
misbehaving. We refer readers to the referenced work for more
detail.
D. Responding to attacks
If Robert detects unexpected activity on a device, or some
verification fails, this is evidence of an attack. Robert’s re-
sponse should be to fix the software on his devices. He should
generate a new long-term key, in order to prevent attacks
occurring (and being detected) due to the disclosure of his
current long-term key. The corresponding public key can be
distributed using the method used in the bootstrapping phase.
Furthermore, he can inform Sally that some of her recent
messages to him may have been compromised.
Robert can also detect failure when he verifies the actions
of the log maintainer. His response is to change to a different
provider.
V. DETAILED MESSAGING PROTOCOL
In this section we present our proposal’s details in several
parts. We first present the log structure in Section V-A. We
then turn to describe the protocol in more detail in Section V-B.
The procedures that ensure that we detect malicious log
maintainers are described in Section V-C. we consider privacy
concerns in Section V-D.
A. Log structure
The public log is organised as a tree of trees: the top-
level tree is append-only, and its leaves are lexicographically
ordered trees.
The top-level tree of the log is implemented by a append-
only Merkle tree [25]. The digest of a log is the root hash
value and the size of this tree. A Merkle tree is a tree in
which every node is labelled with the hash of the labels of its
children nodes. Suppose a node has two children labelled with
hash values h1, h2. Then the label of this node is h(h1, h2).
Merkle trees allow efficient proofs that they contain certain
data. To prove that a certain data item d is part of a Merkle
tree requires an amount of data proportional to the log of the
number of nodes of the tree. (This contrasts with hash lists,
where the amount is proportional to the number of nodes.) If a
TABLE I
THE METHODS SUPPORTED BY THE MERKLE TREE.
Method Input Output
Size T The size of the Merkle tree T
Root T The root value of the Merkle tree T
Last T The data stored in the rightmost side leaf of Merkle tree T
PoP (T, d) Proof of Presence: The proof that d is in T
PoC (T, d) Proof of Currency: The proof that d is the last leaf in T
PoA (T, a) Proof of Absence: The proof that any data d having attribute a is absent
from the Merkle tree T . This proof can only work if items in T are ordered
lexicographically according to the attribute.
PoE (T, dg′) Proof of Extension: The proof that the Merkle tree T is an extension of
another Merkle tree whose digest is dg′. This proof can only work if T is
append-only.
Merkle tree is append-only, i.e. the only supported operation is
to append some data to the tree, then it supports efficient proof
that a version of the tree is extended from a previous version.
If items in a Merkle tree are ordered lexicographically, then the
Merkle tree supports efficient proof that some data is absent
from the tree. The sizes of all the above proofs are proportional
to the log of the number of nodes of the tree. More examples
can be found in [6], [18]. Table I shows methods that a Merkle
tree supports.
The append-only Merkle tree T (as shown in Figure 4)
records the entire update history. Items in T are stored only in
leaves and ordered chronologically, and each leaf is labelled
by the root hash value of another Merkle tree T ′ (presented
in Figure 5). Items in T ′ are also stored only in the leaves,
but ordered according to user identity. Each leaf of T ′ is
labelled by users’ identity and a list of ephemeral certificates
for different devices of the same user.
We give some examples based on Figure 4 and 5 to show
how the proof can be done with our log. We will explain how
to verify that the log is maintained correctly — i.e. the log
maintainer only appends data in T , and items in every T ′ are
ordered lexicographically — in §V-C.
Example of proof of presence To prove that data d′2 for Bob
is in T ′6 (see Figure 5), the log maintainer only needs to give
the data needed to compute the label of parent node from d′2
to the root of the tree.
PoP(T ′6, d
′
2) = [w, d
′
1, h(3,4), h(5,7)]
where w = l · l · r is the path to d′2, and l (resp. r) indicates
the path to the left (resp. right) child. So, given d′2, Root(T
′
6),
and the proof PoP(T ′6, d
′
2), one can verify the proof by recon-
structing the root value hT = h(h(h(d
′
1, d
′
2), h(3,4)), h((5, 7))).
If hT = Root(T
′
6), then the proof is valid.
Example of proof of currency The proof of currency is the
same as the proof of presence, but there is an extra constraint
for the verifier to check, namely that the path to the root of
the lexicographic tree (e.g., the path from the root to d6 in
Figure 4) is of the form r · r . . . · r, i.e., the leaf should be the
rightmost leaf of the tree.
Example of proof of extension To prove that the cur-
rent version of the log represented by T is an extension
of a previous version (Told) containing four updates (i.e.
7h(h(h(d1, d2), h(d3, d4)), h(d5, d6))
h(h(d1, d2), h(d3, d4))
h(d1, d2)
d1 := Root(T
′
1
)
d2 := Root(T
′
2
)
h(d3, d4)
d3 := Root(T
′
3
)
d4 := Root(T
′
4
)
h(d5, d6)
d5 := Root(T
′
5
)
d6 := Root(T
′
6
)
Merkle tree T
Fig. 4. An example of the log containing six updates {d1, d2, . . . , d6}. The
log is an append-only Merkle tree T whose leaves are ordered chronologically.
h(1,7)
h(1,4)
h(1,2)
d′1 := (Alice,
DA,1, tA,1, h(certA,1)
DA,2, tA,2, h(certA,2))
d′2 := (Bob,
DB,1, tB,1, h(certB,1)
DB,2, tB,2, h(certB,2)
. . .
DB,5, tB,5, h(certB,5))
h(3,4)
d′3 d
′
4
h(5,7)
h(5,6)
d′5 d
′
6
d′7 := (Robert,
DR,1, tR,1, h(certR,1)
DR,2, tR,2, h(certR,2)
DR,3, tR,3, h(certR,3)
DR,4, tR,4, h(certR,4))
Merkle tree T ′6
Fig. 5. An example of the data structure T ′ recording data in each update.
Items in T ′ are ordered lexicographically. For all a, b ∈ [1, 7], h(a,b) is the
root hash value of a Merkle tree containing data from d′a to d
′
b
. For example,
h(1,2) = h(d
′
1, d
′
2), and h(1,7) = h(h(1,4), h(5,7)). Each leaf of T
′ is
labelled by (h(ID), (Dj , tj , h(certj))
n
j=1), such that certj is a certificate
on (Dj , ekj , tj) issued by ID, where Dj is the identity of the j
th device of
ID, ekj is an (ephemeral) public encryption key, and tj is the issuing time.
Root(Told) = h(h(d1, d2), h(d3, d4)) and Size(Told) = 4),
the log maintainer gives h(d5, d6) as the proof. Given the
two digests and this proof, the verifier can verify that T
is extended from Told by reconstructing Root(T ). A well
defined algorithm for generating the proof in different cases
is presented in §5.1.2 of [18].
Example of Proof of absence To prove that no certificates
for user identity ‘Bill’ is included in T ′6, the log maintainer
needs to prove that any node whose label containing Bill is
absent from T ′6, by performing the following steps.
• Locate node A such that the user identity contained in
its label is lexicographically the largest one smaller than
Bill. In our example, the label of node A is d′1 which
contains user identity ‘Alice’.
• Locate node B such that the user identity contained in its
label is lexicographically the smallest one greater than
Bill. In our example, the label of node B is d′2 which
contains user identity ‘Bob’.
• Prove that d′1 and d
′
2 are present in T
′
6, and they are
siblings (so no node is placed in between of them). The
former is proved by using proof of presence, and the latter
one can be verified by checking the path to d′1 and d
′
2.
B. Messaging protocol details
We recall the defined system parameters in Table II.
TABLE II
SYSTEM PARAMETERS.
Parameter Explanation
δ the period between the times at which device registration requests are
processed. It is set by the log maintainer. (Typically one hour.)
ǫ the regularity of processing key update requests on the server side. It is set
by the log maintainer. (Typically one day.)
ζ the lifetime of the device ephemeral keys, defined by each individual user.
1) Enrolling a device (Figure 6): We assume that all
Robert’s devices have shared his long-term signing key skR.
To enrol a device Dℓ, it generates a new ephemeral certificate,
and publishes it in the log. In more detail, as presented in
Figure 6:
skR, dgold, σ
old
L
Robert’s device Dℓ
skL, log
Log maintainer
- generate (dkℓ, ekℓ)
- issue CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ)
- dgold = (Root(Told), Size(Told))
m1 = (req1, R, dgold,CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ))
- verify the received certificate and tℓ
- store m1
- dgnew := (Root(T ), Size(T ))
- σL := sign{dgnew, h(CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ))}skL
- P1 := PoE(T, dgold)
m2 = (dgnew, σL, P1)
- verify σL and P1
- dgold := dgnew
- σoldL := σL
- remove any expired keys
After δ time
m3 = (req′1, R,Dℓ, dgnew)
- update the log from T to Tnew
- T := Tnew
- Last(T ) := Root(T ′n+1)
- find d in T ′n+1 such that R is contained in d
- P2 := PoC(T, Last(T ))
- P3 := PoP(T
′
n+1, d)
- P4 := PoE(T, dgnew)
- md := all data associated to d
- dg′new := (Root(T ), Size(T ))
- mL := (dg′new, Last(T ), {Pi}
4
i=2,md, t)
- σ′L := sign{mL}skL
m4 = (mL, σ′L)
- verify σ′L, all received proofs, and that CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ) is in md
- (dgnew, σL) := (dg′new, σ′L)
- display all (Di, ti) to Robert
Fig. 6. The protocol for (re-)enrolling a device. In the protocol, if Robert is
re-enrolling his device, then dgold and σ
old
L are the previously stored digest
and signature received from the log maintainer, respectively.
• Dℓ generates a new ephemeral key pair (dkℓ, ekℓ) for
decryption and encryption, respectively. Then, Dℓ issues
a certificate CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ) on (Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ) by using
skR, where tℓ is the key creation time; and sends the
signed registration request
m1 = (req1, R, dgold,CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ)) to the log,
where req1 is the request identity, R is the identity of
Robert, and dgold = (Root(Told), Size(Told)) is the digest
of the log that Robert possibly has previously stored (it is
likely to happen if Robert is re-enrolling his device Dℓ).
• After the log maintainer receives the request, it verifies
the signature and the certificate, and that tℓ is in the time
interval of the current update epoch δ. If they are all
valid, it stores the request, and issues a signed confirma-
8tion sign{Root(log), Size(log),CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ)}skL ,
where log is organised as T , as explained in §V-A. If
dgold is provided, the log maintainer also generates a
proof P of extension that the current log is extended from
the log represented by dgold, and sends the proof together
with signed confirmation as the message m2 to Robert.
• Dℓ verifies the received signature and proof, stores the
new digest dgnew with signature σL, and sends the
request m3 containing a request identity req
′
1, Robert and
the device’s identity (R,Dℓ), and current observed digest
to the log maintainer after δ time.
• After each period of length δ, the log maintainer updates
the log according to the list of device enrollment requests
received from its customers. The list of requests should
be in the form
(Ri, (CertskRi (Di,j , eki,j , ti,j))
P
j=1)
M
i=1
where Ri is the client identity, P is the number of devices
that a client has requested to enroll this update, and M is
the total number of clients who have sent the enrollment
request for this update.
To update the log, the log maintainer retrieves the current
T ′n such that Root(T
′
n) = Last(T ), and creates T
′
n+1 by
adding each request to the appropriate node of T ′n, where
n is the size of the current log. It then extends T with a
new rightmost node T ′n+1.
In addition, the log maintainer proves that the list of
certificates (including the ones in the enrollment request)
for each participant Ri is complete, and current in the log.
If Ri has previously observed a digest dgold of the log,
then log maintainer also generates a proof of extension
that the current log is extended from the log represented
by dgold. To do so, the log maintainer locates the node
labelled with d for Ri in T
′
n+1, and generates:
– PoP(T ′n+1, d) that d is present in T
′
n+1;
– PoC(T, T ′n+1) that the root hash value of T
′
n+1 is the
label of the rightmost leaf in T ; and
– PoE(T, dgold) that the current log is extended from the
log represented by dgold.
So Ri can verify that d — which contains a full list of
certificates for his devices (including the newly enrolled
ones) — is present in the latest update of the log.
• Dℓ verifies the received proofs and signatures. Addition-
ally, it displays the table (Di, ti) (for all i ∈ [1, P ]) to
Robert, so he can check that the devices mentioned are
indeed recently used. If Robert sees a device mentioned
that he has not recently used, it is evidence of an attack
that an attacker who has used his long-term key without
authorisation and has inserted a certificate for him.
The device is now ready to be used. A similar process is
used to un-register a device with the log maintainer.
2) Sending and receiving a message (Figure 7): To send
a message to Robert, Sally’s device retrieves all the current
device certificates for Robert from the log, and encrypts the
messages with each of them. More precisely (as presented in
Figure 7), to send a message:
• Sally sends request m1 = (req2, R, r, dgold) to the log,
skL, log, vkR
Log maintainer
dgold, σ
old
L , vkR, vkL
Sally
skR, dki
Robert’s device Di
- generate random number r
- dgold := (Root(Told), Size(Told))
m1 = (req2, R, r, dgold)
- Last(T ) := Root(T ′)
- find d in T ′ such that R is contained in d
- P1 := PoC(T, Last(T ))
- P2 := PoP(T
′, d)
- P3 := PoE(T, dgold)
- md := all data associated to d
- dgnew = (Root(T ), Size(T ))
- mL := (‘CertResp’, dgnew, Last(T ), {Pi}
3
i=1, r,md, t)
- σL := sign{mL, r}skL
m2 = (mL, σL)
- verify t, σL, all received proofs and certificates
- set dgold := dgnew and σ
old
L := σL
- extract eki from each received certificate
- create symmetric key k
m3 = ({m}k, {k}eki) for all i
- decrypt {k}eki by using dki
- decrypt {m}k by using k
Fig. 7. The protocol for sending and receiving a message. In which, σoldL is
the signature received from the log maintainer in the last session. If any of
the stated verification checks fails, the agent aborts the protocol.
where req2
3 is the request identity, R is the identity
of Robert, r is a random number, and where dgold =
(Root(Told), Size(Told)) is the digest of the log that Sally
received in the last session.
• After receiving the request, the log maintainer locates the
leaf whose label d contains R in the latest update T ′ (that
is represented by the rightmost leaf of T ), and generates
the proof P1 that Root(T
′) is current in T , proof P2 that d
is in T ′, and proof P3 that the current log is an extension
of the log that Sally has previously observed. It then sends
m2 to Sally. In particular, m2 is the signed message
(‘CertResp’, dgnew, Last(T ), P1, P2, P3, r,md, t), where
‘CertResp’ is a tag, dgnew = (Root(T ), Size(T )), md =
(R, (Dj , tj , ekj ,Certj)
P
j=1) is the data associated to d,
and t is the time to identify the current epoch.
• After receiving the message from the log maintainer,
Sally verifies if t corresponds to the current epoch, and
verifies the received signature, proofs, and certificates. If
all verifications succeed, she replaces dgold and σ
old
L by
dgnew and σL, respectively, where σL is the signature
from the log maintainer.
Her device encrypts a copy of the message with a fresh
symmetric key k, and encrypts k with each received eki.
It sends the encrypted message and together with the
encrypted k to each of Robert’s devices.
• Robert picks up any of his devices, receives the encrypted
message, and decrypts it.
Note that in the protocol, if there is no certificate for Robert
in the latest update, then a proof of absence that the identity
of Robert is not in the latest update is provided to the user.
3This request corresponds to the ‘CertReq’ in our Tamarin code.
9skR, dk
old
ℓ , Certold, dgold, σ
old
L
Robert’s device Dℓ
skL, log
Log maintainer
- generate (dkℓ, ekℓ) and issue CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ)
- dgold = (Root(Told), Size(Told))
m1 = (req3, R, dgold,CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ))
- verify the received certificate and tℓ
- dgnew := (Root(T ), Size(T ))
- σL := sign{‘Confirmation’, dgnew, h(CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ))}skL
- Last(T ) := Root(T ′)
- find d in T ′ such that R is in d
- P1 := PoC(T, Last(T ))
- P2 := PoP(T
′, d)
- P3 := PoE(T, dgold)
- store m1
- md := all data associated to d
m2 = (dgnew,md, σL, {Pi}
3
i=1)
- verify σL, all received proofs, and that h(Certold) is in md
- dgold := dgnew
- σoldL := σL
- remove expired keys
- display all (Di, ti) to Robert
At the end of the epoch w.r.t. ǫ
Update the log similar to the update in Figure 6
Fig. 8. The protocol for updating keys. In the protocol, dkold
ℓ
is the current
valid ephemeral secret key, Certold is the corresponding certificate, dgold
and σoldL are the digest and signature received from the log maintainer in the
last session, respectively.
3) Updating the keys (Figure 8): Devices change their key
every epoch w.r.t. ǫ, and if they don’t do so (because the
application is not invoked on a particular day), then their key
will be reused for a certain period (e.g. a few more ǫ), and
then will not be included in the log for the next further update
epoch. In this last case, the device can’t be used for receiving
and reading messages until Robert uses the device again — it
will re-register the device automatically. So, after Robert can
use this device again in δ time (e.g. one hour). Note that if
Robert has un-registered the device, then the device will not
automatically re-register itself; and Robert has to re-register it
manually in this case.
More precisely, whenever Robert invokes the messaging app
on a device Dℓ, the device checks to see if it is the first time
it has run the app during that epoch w.r.t. ǫ. If so,
• Dℓ creates a new ephemeral key pair (dkℓ, ekℓ), issues
a certificate CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ), which will become the
valid key in next epoch, where tℓ is the key creation time.
Then, he sends the signed request
m1 = (req3, R, dgold,CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ)) to the log
maintainer, where req3
4 is the identity of update request,
dgold = (Root(Told), Size(Told)) is the digest of the log
that he observed in the last session.
• After receiving the request, the log maintainer verifies
the signature, time tℓ, and the received certificate. If
they are all valid, then it generates a commitment σL =
sign{‘Confirmation’, dgnew, h(CertskR(Dℓ, ekℓ, tℓ))}skL
that it will put the received new certificate in the log by
the end of this epoch. The log maintainer locates the node
d for Robert in the latest update of the log, and generates
the proof P1 that the root hash value of T
′ is the label of
the rightmost leaf in T , proof P2 that d is present in T
′,
and the proof P3 that T is an extension of the log that
4This request corresponds to the ‘UpdateReq’ in our Tamarin code.
Robert has observed in the last session. Note that P1 and
P2 together form the proof that d is the latest update for
Robert in the log. The log maintainer sends the generated
signature and proofs to Dℓ.
• Upon receiving the response, Dℓ verifies all signatures
and proofs. Additionally, it verifies that the hashed cer-
tificate (contained in d) for Dℓ in the latest update is
indeed corresponding to the one it created and sent in
the previous epoch. This verification ensures that no
unauthorised request has been generated and recorded in
the current log. (We will explain in the §V-C that why we
don’t need to require Dℓ to verify all history certificates
for Dℓ in the log are indeed generated by Dℓ.) If all
verifications succeed,Dℓ removes any expired keys stored
in Dℓ, replaces the stored digest of the log with the new
one, and displays the table (Di, ti) (for each possible i)
to Robert, so he can check that the devices mentioned are
indeed recently used. If Robert sees a device mentioned
that he has not recently used, it is evidence of an attack.
• At the turn of the epoch, the log maintainer inserts all
received update request into the log. Suppose in the
current epoch, the log maintainer which maintains the log
(represented by T of size n) has the tree T ′n containing
(Alice, DA,1, tA,1, h(certA,1)
DA,2, tA,2, h(certA,2)),
(Bob, DB,1, tB,1, h(certB,1)
DB,2, tB,2, h(certB,2)
. . .
DB,5, tB,5, h(certB,5)),
. . . . . .
and receives
(Ri, (CertskRi
(Di,j , eki,j , ti,j))
P ′
j=1)
M′
i=1
for some identity Ri and certificates for its devices Di,j ,
where P ′ is the number of a user’s devices that have
sent a key update request, and M ′ is the total number
of clients who have sent the key update request in this
epoch.
To update the log, the log maintainer performs the fol-
lowing steps:
Step 1) creates a new tree T ′n+1 by copying and pasting
the entire T ′n;
Step 2) replaces the old certificates with the correspond-
ing new ones in T ′n+1;
Step 3) checks if any un-replaced certificate is older than
ζ; if there is any, the log maintainer removes
them from T ′n+1;
Step 4) extends T with a new rightmost node
Root(T ′n+1).
Similar to the idea explained in §V-B1, the log maintainer
can provide the proof that the list of certificates (including
the ones in the key update request) for Ri is complete,
and current in the log; and the proof that the current log is
an extension of the log that Ri has previously observed.
If a device has not updated ephemeral keys and has been
excluded from the latest update by the log maintainer,
then the device will automatically re-register itself when
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the owner has used the device again, so the device will be
included in the log and be ready to receive and decrypt
messages in δ time.
C. Crowd-sourced verification
Since we want to guarantee some security even when the
log maintainer is not trusted, we need to monitor the log
maintainer’s behaviour to see if the log is maintained correctly.
This can be easily verified by allowing any interested party to
download and check the entire log at any time. Parties can set
themselves up as monitors to perform such checks as a public
service. Alternatively or in addition, to avoid having to rely
on such monitors, we can use crowd-sourced verification by
breaking the verification work into independent little pieces,
and distribute each piece to different devices.
First, we need to verify that the log update history recorded
in T is maintained in an append-only manner. This is achieved
by verifying the proof of extension performed in the pro-
tocols for enrolling a device, updating the keys, and send-
ing/receiving a message. Hence, there is no need for any
additional verification.
Second, we need to verify that in each update T ′i , items are
ordered lexicographically according to the user identity. It can
be verified by asking each device to pick a random leaf in
an update T ′i , and verify that the user identity recorded in its
left (or right) neighbour leaf is lexicographically smaller (resp.
greater) than the user identity in the picked leaf.
Third, in our protocol a device only checks its latest
certificate in the log, instead of verifying all certificates
recorded in the log. So, it cannot guarantee that no attacker-
generated certificates have been previously included in the
log. To detect such behaviour, we need to verify that the time
of the key generation for the same device in different updates
of the log is only going forward. To achieve this, each device
picks a random leaf for a user in an update Ti, and verifies
that either the record in an update is the same as the one in
the previous update, or it is different and the time in the node
for the same device of the user in the left (or right) neighbour
update Ti−1 (or Ti+1) is no greater (or no smaller) than the
time in the picked leaf, respectively. Additionally, if the two
times are equal, then the hash values of the certificates should
also be equal. A missing associated record in a new update is
evidence of misbehaviour. If no leaf for the user is included
in the neighbour update, then a proof of absence that a node
containing the user identity is not included in the update is
provided.
Remark. Note that these checks ensure that the log is
maintained correctly, and the most recently published device
key of all user devices are recorded in the latest log update
(i.e. the rightmost leaf of the top level tree, see §V-A). Any
unexpected record is evidence of misbehaviour of the log
maintainer. Thus, to detect the un-authorised usage of the
long-term keys, users only need to check their device records
against the records in the latest log update, as stated in the
protocol for enrolling a device and for updating the keys.
D. Privacy considerations
The public log may cause some privacy concerns. For
example, depending on deployment specifics, one may want
to hide the user identities contained in a log against potential
spammers, the total number of communications of a user, or
the time distribution of a user’s communications, etc. We
provide an informal discussion here, and leave a detailed
formal study on the privacy of transparent log based systems
as a future work.
To hide the user identity, the log maintainer can issue a
signature on a user identity, then use a hash value of the signed
user identity in the labels of leaves in each log update, rather
than containing the user identity directly in the labels (see
Figure 5). The signature scheme used should be deterministic
and unforgeable, as suggested in [7]. Hence, users that have
the recipient’s address can request the signed user identity
from the log maintainer, and verify the log; but an attacker
who has downloaded the entire log cannot recover the identity
of users, based on the unforgeability of the chosen signature
scheme. In this case, the nodes in each update tree T ′i will be
ordered lexicographically according to the hash value of the
signed user identity. In addition, users can also make the log
to be only available to a fixed set of contacts. To hide the real
number of communications associated to a given client of the
log, the client can generate some noise — for example, the
client can make ‘spoof queries’ to the log maintainer through
an anonymous channel (e.g. Tor network).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We provide all input files required to understand and repro-
duce our security analysis at [29]. In particular, these include
the complete DECIM models. The proof assumes that all users
see the same log (a gossip protocol can be used to detect
attacks in which different views of the log are presented to
different users). We also assume that each user has only one
device. The detection of some attacks when a user has multiple
devices would need the user’s involvement. A formal study on
the user behavior and security analysis with multiple devices
is an interesting future work.
Security properties Our messaging protocol achieves both
classical security properties as well as novel ones. In a classical
sense, Sally obtains the guarantee that if Robert’s devices are
not compromised, then the attacker will not learn the messages
she sends.
The more interesting properties are achieved in the cases
where Robert’s devices get compromised. In this case, we
cannot avoid that messages sent by Sally in the same epoch are
also compromised. However, we prove that if any of Sally’s
messages from different epochs are compromised, then Robert
will be able to detect this.
Formal analysis We analyse the main security proper-
ties of the protocol using the TAMARIN prover [30]. The
Tamarin prover is a symbolic analysis tool that can prove
properties of security protocols for an unbounded number of
instances and supports reasoning about protocols with mutable
global state, which makes it suitable for our log-based protocol.
Protocols are specified using multiset rewriting rules, and
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properties are expressed in a guarded fragment of first order
logic that allows quantification over timepoints.
TAMARIN is capable of automatic verification in many
cases, and it also supports interactive verification by manual
traversal of the proof tree. If the tool terminates without finding
a proof, it returns a counter-example. Counter-examples are
given as so-called dependency graphs, which are partially
ordered sets of rule instances that represent a set of executions
that violate the property. Counter-examples can be used to
refine the model, and give feedback to the implementer and
designer.
Modeling aspects We used several abstractions during mod-
eling. We model the Merkle hash trees as lists, similar to the
abstraction used in [19].
We model the protocol roles S (sender), R (receiver) and
L (log maintainer) by a set of rewrite rules. Each rewrite rule
typically models receiving a message, taking an appropriate ac-
tion, and sending a response message. Our modeling approach
is similar to most existing TAMARIN models. Our modeling
of the roles directly corresponds to the protocol descriptions
in the previous sections. TAMARIN provides built-in support
for a Dolev-Yao style network attacker, i.e., one who is in
full control of the network. We also specify rules that enable
the attacker to compromise devices and learn their long and
short-term secrets.
The final DECIM model consists of 450 lines for the base
model, and six main property specifications, examples of
which we will give below.
Proof goals We state several proof goals for our DECIM
model, exactly as specified in TAMARIN’s syntax. Since
TAMARIN’s property specification language is a fragment of
first-order logic, it contains logical connectives (|, &, ==>,
not, ...) and quantifiers (All, Ex). In Tamarin, proof goals are
marked as lemma. The #-prefix is used to denote timepoints,
and “E @ #i” expresses that the event E occurs at timepoint
i.
The first goal is a check for executability that ensures that
our model allows for the successful transmission of a message.
It is encoded in the following way.
lemma protocol_correctness:
exists-trace
" /* It is possible that */
Ex d R skR dkR m #i.
/* R received an encrypted message m on device d */
MsgReceived(d, R, skR, dkR, m) @ #i
/* without the adversary compromising any device. */
& not (Ex d2 A ltk dkR #j.
Compromise_Device(d2, A, ltk, dkR) @ #j)"
The property holds if the TAMARIN model exhibits a
behaviour in which one of R’s devices received a message
without the attacker compromising any device. This property
mainly serves as a sanity check on the model. If it did not hold,
it would mean our model does not model the normal (honest)
message flow, which could indicate a flaw in the model.
Tamarin automatically proves this property in a few seconds
and generates the expected trace in the form of a graphical
representation of the rule instantiations and the message flow.
We additionally proved several other sanity-checking prop-
erties to minimize the risk of modeling errors.
The second example goal is the core secrecy property with
respect to a classical attacker, and expresses that unless the
attacker compromises one of Robert’s keys, he cannot learn
any messages sent by Sally. Note that K(m) is a special event
that denotes that the attacker knows m at this time.
lemma message_secrecy:
"All R skR ekR m #i.
/* If S sent a message m to R */
( MsgSent(R, skR, ekR, m) @ #i &
/* without the adversary compromising any of Robert’s
devices */
not (Ex #j d sk dkR.
Compromise_Device(d, R, sk, dkR) @ #j)
) ==>
/* then the adversary cannot know m */
(not ( Ex #j. K(m) @ #j) ) "
TAMARIN also proves this property automatically.
The above result implies that if Robert receives a message
that was sent by Sally, and the attacker did not compromise
his device during the current epoch, then the attacker will not
learn the message.
The final property encodes the unique security guarantees
provided by our protocol. If the attacker compromises Robert’s
device in an epoch, he can use the private ephemeral key
to decrypt Sally’s messages in that epoch. We prove that if
he uses the compromised long-term key of Robert to learn
messages sent by Sally in other epochs, then he will be
detected once Robert checks the log.
lemma detect_usage_S_sends:
"All d skR dkR m #i1 #i2 #i3 detectionresult R k.
/* If S sent to R an encrypted message m,
where pk(dkR)=ekR */
( MsgSent(R, skR, pk(dkR), m) @ #i1 &
/* and the adversary knows m */
K(m) @ #i2 &
/* and the ephemeral key used by the sender was
not compromised, i.e., the compromise occurred
in a different epoch */
not (Ex #j sk .
Compromise_Device(d, R, sk, dkR) @ #j ) &
/* and Robert afterwards checks the log */
CheckedLog(d, R, detectionresult, k ) @ #i3
& #i1 < #i3
) ==>
/* then we detect a compromise */
( (detectionresult = ’bad’) ) "
The property states that if Sally sends a message when
Robert’s device is not controlled by an attacker in the current
epoch (but might have been compromised previously), and the
attacker learns the message, then Robert detects the fact that
his key was previously compromised when he next verifies the
log.
The above properties are all proven automatically by the
TAMARIN prover on a laptop within a few minutes. Overall,
the modeling effort was in the order of weeks, with several
iterations to debug both the abstract model and the property
specifications. The verification process helped us not only to
prove, but also to refine the precise security properties of our
protocol.
VII. REALIZATION IN PRACTICE
A. Estimating communication cost
To check if deployment might be feasible, we estimate the
expected cost of our protocol design. As an example, we
consider the following scenario. We assume that there are 109
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TABLE III
THE SIZE OF MESSAGES IN DIFFERENT PROTOCOLS. IN WHICH, SIZEP IS
THE SIZE OF PROOFS IN THE CORRESPONDING MESSAGE, AND SIZEM IS
THE MAXIMUM SIZE OF A MESSAGE.
Message sizeP sizeM
Enrolling a device
request - 1.6 KB
response 2.2 KB 2.5 KB
Total 4.1 KB
Fetching keys from log
request - 78 B
response 2.2 KB 6.9 KB
Total 7 KB
Updating the keys
request - 1.5 KB
response 2.2 KB 2.5 KB
Total 4 KB
crowd-sourced verification
Total 5.3 KB 5.9 KB
users, each user has 3 devices, the log has been operating for
100 years, the log update period δ for registration request is
1 hour, and the log update epoch ǫ for certificate update is 1
day.
In this scenario, the size of T will be 100 · 365+100 · 365 ·
24 = 912500 < 220, and the size of each T ′ is 109 which is
less than 230. In addition, we assume that the size of a hash
value is 256 bits (e.g. SHA256), the size of a signature is 64
Bytes (e.g. ECDSA), and the size of a certificate is 1.5 KB.
In addition, we assume that the size of a user (or device)
identity is 12 Bytes, and time is in the 64-bit format, a random
number is 28 bytes (recommended by TLS 1.2 [31]), each
request identifier is 4 bits, and the size of a digest of a log is
300 bits.
The size of a proof of presence that some data is in T and
is in T ′ will be at most 640 bytes and 960 bytes, respectively;
the size of the proof that a version of the log is extended from
a previous version is at most 640 bytes. We present the size
of messages in the protocol in our example scenario in Table
III.
From Table III we can see that up to 5 KB data are needed
to be transferred for both enrolling a device and updating
keys. The protocol for fetching keys from the log is the most
expensive one, as the sender has to download all certificates
for different devices of the same users. In our example, the
sender needs to download 3 certificates, the size of which is
already 4.5 KB.
The results of our analysis indicate that the space cost of
our system is acceptable.
B. Proof-of-concept log server prototype
To demonstrate the deployment of DECIM in a real-world
setting, we built a proof-of-concept prototype of the log
server. We implemented a full log server implementation with
interfaces, and client-side code for (a) adding users/devices,
(b) rotating keys at the end of each epoch, and (c) sending
messages. This involves all the operations to manipulate the
log (consisting of a tree of trees), produce various proofs, and
produce and verify the appropriate signatures. Anticipating
a deployment on platforms such as Google’s App Engine,
we implemented our code in Python. We use basic caching
mechanisms for previously computed results.
On a quad-core 4 GHz Intel Core i7 with 32 GB of memory,
we obtain the following times. The times are measured locally
and therefore do not include network latency. Performing
100000 (1e05) enrollment requests from distinct users takes
1526 seconds, i.e., 15 milliseconds per request on average.
When 100000 (1e05) users enroll 3 devices each, enrollment
takes 1708 seconds, i.e., 5.7 milliseconds on average. The
delay experienced by the user is therefore dominated by the
network latency of transmitting 4.1 KB (Table III), which is
certainly less than a second.
When the tree contains 10000 (1e04) entries, the server
produces 100000 (1e05) responses to message queries in 14.1
seconds, i.e., 0.14 milliseconds per message query. Updating
a tree by simultaneously adding 10000 (1e04) entries takes
about 1 second, which is mostly spent in creating the leaf
data structures. Once again, the user’s experience is mostly
affected by the network latency, which is small because the
data transferred is a few KB.
The memory usage when 100000 (1e05) users enroll one
device is 410 MB (computed using “heapy” for the full
process, not just reachable objects). If they enroll three devices
each, memory usage increases to 900 MB.
Thus, even though our proof-of-concept implementation is
not yet optimized for efficiency or storage, its performance
already indicates our scheme is feasible.
VIII. CONCLUSION
End-to-end encryption has become popular in the years
since the Snowden revelations, motivating attackers wishing to
intercept messages to instead turn their attention to client end-
points. To address this, we have presented a novel messaging
protocol that offers security guarantees even when an attacker
can access all the secret keys in a user’s devices. In particular,
(a) the protocol limits the impact of a compromise, since the
attacker can only learn messages sent in the same epoch with-
out being detected, and (b) if the attacker uses compromised
long-term keys to impersonate users, then the protocol allows
the participants to detect this, and therefore to take remedial
action. Our protocol supports multiple devices per user, and
the multiplicity of devices helps detect attacks by intuitive
indicators to users about which (device) keys have recently
been active.
The methods we introduce are not intended to replace
existing methods used to keep keys safe. Existing technologies
such as Axolotl ratcheting, TPMs, smart-cards, and ARM
TrustZone are all useful for securing keys. However, none of
these technologies are completely secure. For example, even
if hardware security is used, malware may be able to trigger
usages of the key without having the ability to copy the key.
Our methods can also detect such cases. Thus, DECIM adds
an additional layer of security that allows users to detect when
other layers fail.
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